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Zitzewitz’s suggestion, in a Journal of Industrial Economics March 2003 article, that 
Britain’s pre-World War One lead over the USA in tobacco manufacturing productivity 
was due to its more competitive market cannot be sustained. A larger country sample 
shows a positive relationship between concentration and productivity, while accurate 
measurement of US and UK concentration shows similar concentration levels until 1911. 
The later US lead, though plausibly induced by antitrust-enforced competition, was due 
to tougher labour management rather than to stronger technical innovation. 
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Concentration and Productivity: a Broader Perspective.  
by Leslie Hannah, Department of Economics, University of Tokyo 
 
Eric Zitzewitz rightly emphasizes the potential of using international comparisons to 
understand the dynamics of productivity change (Zitzewitz 2003).
1 He reports that, over 
sixty years around the turn of the nineteenth century, in both the UK and the USA, the 
tobacco industry did best in periods of competition, whereas labour productivity 
stagnated in periods of monopoly. This note suggests that some of his findings cannot 
survive an accurate measurement of the concentration variable, nor an expansion of his 
country sample from two to eleven. Nonetheless, his dummy variable could be capturing 
an alternative, and often neglected, behavioural explanation of the US-UK productivity 
divide. 
 
Zitzewitz identifies the one-firm concentration ratio as the appropriate measure of the 
degree of monopoly (2003, Figure 3). He then interprets his detailed observations of this 
ratio for five tobacco sectors over 21 years as a dummy variable showing the US industry 
as monopolized in 1890-1911 (the former being the date of the merger of 90% of US 
cigarette production into American Tobacco and the latter the date of the antitrust break-
up of that company), while the UK industry is described as monopolized from 1902-1939 
(that is, from when the dominant UK firm, Wills, merged with its main competitors to 
form Imperial Tobacco in 1901-1902, until 1939, the terminal date of his study). The 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to Eric Zitzewitz for constructive discussion of an earlier version, though that does not 
implicate him in any remaining errors. 
  2essence of his econometric results is that the UK took the productivity lead in the first 
period, when it was more competitive than America, but that antitrust action (the 1911 
break-up of the US trust) then led to greater technological progress and higher labour 
productivity in the USA. 
 
Stigler (1966) preferred the Herfindahl index to the one-firm concentration ratio in his 
earlier Anglo-US cigarette industry comparison for 1900-1960, but it would be pedantic 
to insist on this more comprehensive measure. In the tobacco industry, the dominant 
firms in both countries soon became very dominant and the difference boils down to 
whether one firm or several controlled a very large share of output: the one-firm 
concentration ratio is actually perfectly targeted on capturing that (Hannah and Kay 
1976). However, Zitzewitz appears to have been misled in his classification by the 
contemporary American habit of dividing its large manufactured tobacco industry into 
five or more sectors (for, example, cigars, snuff, cigarettes, plug/twist and smoking 
tobacco, Zitzewitz, 2003, but see Commissioner of Corporations 1909, 1915 for finer 
classifications). By contrast, the British sources, dealing with a more highly-taxed and 
hence much smaller industry, typically quote the dominant firm’s market share for 
cigarettes only (a new product which rapidly rose from 4% of the UK manufactured 
tobacco market in 1890 to 42% in 1912) or for the whole tobacco industry (Monopolies 
Commission 1961, Alford 1973). Generally the finer the product definition the higher the 
average recorded market share, but it is a simple matter to convert the figures to a 
common basis.
2 Table I shows the share by weight in all domestic manufactured tobacco  
                                                 
2 All tobacco outputs in both countries are measured in pounds avoirdupois, except US cigar and cigarette 
output, which is reported in numbers of sticks. I have used the standard industry assumption that one 
  3 
 
Table I. One-firm concentration ratios in the US and UK tobacco industries.                        
                                                         USA                                           UK 
                                                            %                                                % 
1890                                           3                                                7 
1895                                          13                                               8 
          1900                                          47                                              11 
          1905                                          70                                              52 
          1910                                          68                                              58 
          1913                                          21                                              na 
1915                                          na                                              63 
1919                                          14                                              na                                                         
1920                                          na                                              74 
1934                                          20                                              75 
          1948                                          na                                              79 
                                               Source: see Statistical Appendix 
sales of American Tobacco in the USA and of Wills (from 1901, Imperial) in the UK. 
There can be no debate that America was less concentrated after the 1911 break-up, but 
suggesting that “the US and UK were monopolised at different times” (Zitzewitz, 2003, p. 
                                                                                                                                                 
cigarette weighs a gram (or, less conveniently, 15.4 grains avoirdupois), applied this also to little cigars; but 
adopted Zitzewitz’s estimate (63.0 grains avoirdupois) of the weight of a big cigar. I suspect that the latter 
is high for this early period, but the trust specialised in cheaper (and presumably lighter?) cigars, so the 
biases may be self-cancelling in a concentration ratio, and any plausible adjustment of these assumptions 
would not change the measured concentration by more than one percentage point. Calculation of 
concentration ratios by value added or sales revenues rather than weight requires more assumptions, but, 
given that most US value-added and sales were in (low concentration) cigars and most British value-added 
in (high concentration) cigarettes, it would likely result in higher British than US concentration levels.  
  412) is putting a rather strong interpretation on the pattern shown for the pre-1911 
benchmark years in Table I.
3  For both countries the striking reinforcement of market 
power is around the turn of the century and concentration levels are quite similar in all 
benchmark years, except 1900; and that year differs only because the key mergers that 
achieved dominance were spread over 1898-1902 in the USA (and half completed by 
1900) but in Britain were bunched in 1901-1902, hardly a critical difference in 
competitive conditions. It is moot whether the correct industry boundary is the tobacco 
industry as a whole, rather than just cigarettes, but, since cigarettes were of rather minor 
(and not consistently increasing) importance in the American tobacco market (peaking at 
6% of domestic leaf tobacco use in 1896 and 1911, but falling below 3% in 1901-1905, 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1892-1912), the frequently quoted one-firm 
concentration ratio in cigarettes alone is wholly inappropriate when the dependant 
variable is the entire tobacco industry.
4 Moreover, although the US tobacco market was 
more traditional and took up cigarettes much more slowly than the UK, there were, in this 
period of rapidly evolving tastes, high price cross-elasticities of demand between 
alternative smoking products, so Zitzewitz’s decision to treat the tobacco industry as a 
whole seems the right one.
5
                                                 
3 From the dummy variables in the equations it appears that the precise meaning of this is that the USA was 
monopolised in 1890 and the UK in 1902 
4 Even in cigarettes alone the differences are not overwhelming: for example, in 1895 Wills’ share was 53% 
and American’s 86%. Zitzewitz’s discussion of Ogden’s competition with Wills suggests he may also have 
had in mind contestability of markets. Again, however, the quantitative indications do not support this: 
Wills’ share in cigarettes, removing the market share effects of the 1901-02 mergers, declined from 53% to 
48% during the turn-of-the-century period of competition, whereas, with similar adjustments for mergers, 
American Tobacco’s core cigarette market share fell from 86% to 56% (Alford 1973, Commissioner of 
Corporations 1909). But, of course, contestability thus measured is a function of monopoly pricing or 
product positioning mistakes, as well as real barriers to entry, so this may simply reflect the managerial 
incompetence or bad luck of American Tobacco, not inherently high contestability (though it is not clear 
how the latter can otherwise be measured). 
5 During the Spanish-American War, for example, when US cigarette taxes were increased by 200% but 
cigar taxes increased by only 20%, the number of cigars smoked rose from equality with American 
  5 
It is not obvious that these two economies with only mildly differing concentration levels 
before 1912 are the right places to look for evidence of performance differentials deriving 
from variations in market concentration. A strikingly larger range of variation is 
observable in the manufactured tobacco industries of other major industrial economies. 
Exceptionally, the long-term effect of pure monopoly is observable in France, Italy and 
Austria (where there were state-owned, statutory monopolies) and the shorter-term 
impact in Japan (which had nationalized its competitive, and hitherto private, tobacco 
manufacturing industry in 1904). Private ownership, as in the US and UK, was the norm 
in all other large markets, though in Spain the private monopoly took over a 100% market 
share by franchising a previously criticised state monopoly. Canada and Australia were 
also even more concentrated than the US and UK, since Imperial and American Tobacco 
had subsumed their interests there in joint local subsidiaries of BAT (Cox 2000, 
Wilkinson 1914). Germany and Russia experienced the most consistently competitive 
regimes in the private sector: their one-firm concentration ratio probably stayed around 
10% even after the turn of the century, when Table I shows both the US and UK 
becoming significantly more concentrated.
6
                                                                                                                                                 
cigarettes to three times their level, implying high cross-elasticities (Commissioner of Corporations 1909). 
It seems intuitively plausible that there were lower cross-elasticities between chewing tobaccos on the one 
hand (largely confined to dockers and miners in Britain, but a more widespread addiction in the USA) and 
all smoking modes on the other; but omitting all chewing tobaccos, and calculating concentration in a 
combined smoking sector, including cigars, cigarettes and loose, cut smoking tobacco (used for pipes or 
roll-your-own), would actually decrease US concentration, as would the hiving-off of snuff, in which the 
trust’s monopoly was strongest of all and which had about the same share of the US tobacco market as 
cigarettes. 
 
6 In Germany Jasmatzi (BAT) was the second largest cigarette producer, and not far behind the leader, for 
much of the period, but had about 10% of the market: it was not until further acquisitions in 1912 that 
BAT’s cigarette market share rose to 25%, and that still left it below 10% of the whole tobacco market 
(Bormann 1910, Cox 2000, Wolf 1918).The Russian merger of thirteen companies, giving the new Russian 
  6 
Table II. Productivity in manufactured tobacco, ca.1912. 
 
                                     Output per person              Estimated one-firm    
                                              employed                       concentration          
                                           (lbs. per year)                         ratio 
                                                                    
        France                             5,030                                   100 
        Australia                         3,283                                     89 
        UK                                  3,212                                     60 
        Canada                            2,852                                     80  
        USA                                2,721                                   21-68+ 
        Italy                                 2,412                                   100 
        Japan                               2,404                                   100 
       Austria                             2,277                                    100 
       Spain                                2,023                                   100 
       Russia                              1,811*                                   10 
       Germany                          1,337                                     10  
*cigarettes only.  
+before and after divestiture  
                                            Source: see Statistical Appendix 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tobacco Company 75% of cigarette output and 56% of other tobacco products, was not completed until 
1914, and the largest firm before that had only 20% of cigarette output, less of tobacco (Kopylov 1976). 
  7 Table II shows physical productivity measures for these eleven countries in 1912, when 
trust control in the US was terminated. The extreme observations show good performance 
is compatible with monopoly (France) and weak performance with competition 
(Germany), but the productivity results for the other countries, including the US and UK, 
are more striking for their similarities, irrespective of concentration level, than their 
differences.
7 It should be recalled that at this time the typical American manufacturing 
worker produced twice as much as the average British or German worker, three times as 
much as the French, ranging up to nearly nine times as much in the case of Japan, so the 
similarities are even more striking relative to what was happening in the rest of their 
economies (Broadberry 1997). Given the quality of the data, too much should not be read 
into small differences in either this or Zitzewitz’s measure, as opposed to the extremes in 
this table or his very large 1930s US lead in tobacco productivity.
8 For cigarettes, at least, 
                                                 
7A linear function would suggest a positive correlation between concentration and productivity, but 
Zitzewitz draws on the theoretical and empirical literature to suggest an inverted “U” relationship. If that 
function were fitted, the top of the inverted “U” would still be at a significantly higher concentration level 
than previously suggested by the studies he cites. It would be interesting also to look at rates of change in 
productivity as well as levels (as Zitzewitz does for the US and UK). While there is evidence in the sources 
cited of extremely rapid productivity increase in the first decade of the twentieth century under both 
competition (Russia) and monopoly (Japan), reliable time-series data is not available for all the countries 
concerned. 
8  I have preferred physical productivity measures on grounds of data reliability and availability 
(Zitzewitz’s value added weights for 1896 depend on the cost accounts of two products with perhaps 5% of 
the market). Zitzewitz’s estimates of the British productivity spurt may be too high for pre-1900 when they 
are based on Wills alone, which probably improved its efficiency more rapidly than the other British 
tobacco firms, which still accounted for around 90% of output. One might expect more divergence between 
our two estimates if one country’s output had a greater value-added to weight ratio, though this seems 
unlikely, from the detailed US data on relative productivity levels in cigars, cigarettes and other tobacco, 
and their relative shares in these. I also use the same industry definition for the denominator and numerator 
of the productivity measure, from the 1912 census, while Zitzewitz uses Todd’s higher estimate of output 
(which incorporates an allowance for products missed by the census), but makes no corresponding 
allowance for the workers who produced that output.  Zitzewitz also applies Rostas’s 1930s adjustments for 
stemming labour and cigar weights, whereas I have taken note of contemporary indicators that such 
adjustments may be inappropriately high (Madsen 1916, Alford 1973). He also uses wage-earners only as 
the denominator (whereas I use all labour, including the self-employed), though this leads him to a lower 
estimate of the British productivity advantage: the US had many thousands of small family tobacco firms, 
with self-employed (and often hand-working) owner-managers, particularly in its important cigar sector. 
The central point is not that my estimates are better, but that for all historical data of this kind, we would be 
  8there is convincing supplementary evidence that both our measures are right to show 
British factories as the more efficient. When American and Imperial merged their 
overseas subsidiaries and exporting interests into the British American Tobacco 
Company (BAT) in 1902, this did more than eliminate the main international competition 
in cigarettes for both countries’ bonded export factories (incidentally reinforcing the 
point that their competitive regimes were similar and, to a degree, endogenous). The new 
BAT (which until 1911 was two-thirds owned - and hence controlled - by the American 
trust and one-third owned by Imperial) froze its hitherto growing US cigarette exports 
and sourced its rapid increase in exports to third countries (principally to China) from the 
UK (Cox 2000). It is not obvious why it should have done this unless the bonded British 
factories it took over in Bristol and Liverpool had lower manufacturing costs than its 
factories in North Carolina and Virginia.
9
 
Clearly the USA was failing to forge ahead in this period, but if this is not related to 
national concentration levels, what was driving this exceptional, early, but short-lived 
global convergence of productivity levels? This is not the place to discuss the engineering 
professionalism of state managers in Japan or France, the contrasting (and counter-
stereotypical) national degrees of product standardisation or of fiscal discrimination 
against cigarettes, or the technical and sales skills of American and European cigarette 
                                                                                                                                                 
wise not to over-interpret small differences in measured productivity levels. It is striking that our results 
show a very similar US productivity gap in 1912.  
 
9All British leaf was imported, mainly from Virginia. The Panama Canal was not completed until 1914, but 
it was still presumably cheaper to ship cigarettes from Virginia to Shanghai, than leaf tobacco from 
Virginia to Bristol, then cigarettes from Bristol to Shanghai (a longer route with more transhipment). 
  9machinery manufacturers.
10 But what is clear in the two countries discussed by Zitzewitz 
is that, while they had similar (initially low, and then - for this industry – middling) levels 
of concentration, there were striking differences in business conduct in the USA, which 
initially were driven by business culture or corporate finance, rather than market structure. 
 
 This is seen most clearly in the contrasting methods by which the dominant market 
shares were built up. In Britain, Wills constantly expanded demand for cigarettes by 
offering lower prices, growing almost entirely internally, both before and after the 
exceptional 1901 merger.
11 By contrast, after the initially impressive performance of its 
constituent companies in the 1880s, American Tobacco’s cigarette sales to the domestic 
market were constrained (its sales actually fell after 1896) and prices raised, in order to 
rack up profits to finance the “long purse” required to win predatory price wars against 
manufacturers of other tobacco products at home and overseas, and to support the new 
stock issues necessary to fund a rapid increase in size through, often contested, 
acquisitions (Commissioner of Corporations, 1909, 1911, 1915, Burns, 1982, 1986, 1989). 
The combination of pugnacity with professional incompetence in American Tobacco’s 
management is hinted at, for example, in Zitzewitz’s comments on overpayments for 
exclusive technology licences and his suggestion of managerial overload is more 
plausible than the hagiographic tone of much other writing on the trust. American 
Tobacco was highly profitable, but its profits increasingly came from objectionable 
                                                 
10 I am currently undertaking a series of quantitative and qualitative international comparisons of these 
issues, in a wider range of industries, under a  Kojima Foundation grant to the Department of Economics at 
the University of Tokyo 
11 Sweet Caporal, the dominant turn-of-the century brand in the USA, was very similar to Woodbine, the 
dominant British brand made with imported Virginia tobacco (though it was maybe 20% larger), but cost 
75% more ex-tax, see Alford 1973, Commissioner of Corporations 1915. 
  10behaviour: rather than creating value through innovative commercial and technical 
contributions, it was more often playing zero-sum or negative-sum games with rivals and 
partners. Its head, James B Duke, avoided the criminal prosecution that some American 
civil servants favoured, but there is evidence of insider dealing at the expense of 
shareholders, union-bashing, economy with the truth bordering on perjury, secret fighting 
companies, attempted bribery of witnesses and other crimes and misdemeanours, 
arguably too numerous to be written off as partisan muckraking journalism 
(Commissioner of Corporations 1911, Moody 1933, Kolko 1963). Of course, various 
interpretations of such evidence are possible. Yet, so egregious was the trust’s behaviour 
that in the decade or so before the First World War it lost its social “licence to operate” 
not only in the USA through the antitrust suit, but also, on account of its overseas 
activities, in Japan and came close to it in the UK, China, Germany, Canada and 
Australia (Anon 1980, Blaich 1975, Cox 2000). Getting up the noses of one set of 
nationalistic politicians and their local business clients in one or two countries could be a 
badge of honour (or of bad luck), but doing the same in seven or more varied countries 
begins to smack of something more seriously amiss, even if not on a scale to match 
Enron. It is unfashionable, despite such recent parallels, to characterise trusts in the way 
American progressives did in the first decade of the century, or to believe that politicians 
bashing business may sometimes be right, but American Tobacco must be a leading 
contender for the title of a “bad trust.” It could be this behavioural characteristic, rather 
than the supposed structural one, that Zitzewitz’s dummy variable for the US between 
1890 and 1911 is picking up: it is difficult to think of an alternative explanation of its 
significant role in the equation. 
  11 
What about the massively de-concentrating 1911 antitrust break-up, the displacement of 
the toxic leader primarily responsible for the earlier policies,
12 the effective prohibition of 
predatory pricing and large mergers, the facilitation of new entry, and the onset of 
oligopolistic competition, in short what of the exception américaine?  After 1911, 
Zitzewitz is on firmer ground. Not only does Table I confirm a widening concentration 
differential, but Broadberry’s comprehensive study confirms his finding that American 
tobacco productivity moves rapidly ahead of Britain, and even further ahead of  (then 
monopolised and cartelised) Germany also (Broadberry 1997).   
 
 By the middle decades of the twentieth century, no major industry in the world had such 
extreme forms of nationally polarised industrial structures as the tobacco industry, or (as 
it increasingly became everywhere) the cigarette industry. Russian competition was 
substantially extinguished in 1913-1914, when the leading producers in Moscow, St 
Petersburg and Rostov-on Don merged to create what was probably the world’s largest 
cigarette firm, leaving only a little further consolidation to Lenin and Stalin. The 
Germans in the 1920s also established a private, unquoted cigarette monopoly, 
orchestrated by Deutsche Bank and the Reemstma family, with 90% of the market. In 
Britain, Imperial Tobacco continued to raise its market share, and in 1933 signed a cartel 
agreement with its remaining domestic competitors. BAT, the industry’s only major 
                                                 
12 Duke found a more congenial home for a serial monopolist in London and became chairman of BAT 
(whose American-owned shares were floated on the London stock exchange in 1912) until 1923. This 
appears to have involved a further remarkable secret insider deal at the expense of shareholders, involving 
paying himself share options worth nearly two-thirds of BAT’s 1911 profits, but he was an increasingly 
absentee chairman after 1914, so it would be unfair to blame him for the increasing relative British 
inefficiency documented by Zitzewitz (which takes no account of the distributional consequences of insider 
looting of shareholder funds) for that period. (Cox 2000) 
  12multinational, and British-controlled from around 1912, also built a dominant market 
position in many other countries, including Canada, Australia, India, China and a number 
of Latin American and African nations. There were a few small industrial countries, like 
Belgium, where industrial concentration levels (as formally measured) resembled 
America’s, but this was misleading: unlike in the USA, cartels there explicitly divided 
markets. Already in 1912, there was little international trade outside Asia, and there was 
even less import competition later, so only America by the 1930s experienced consistent 
and effective competition in its domestic market. (Cox 2000) 
 
Given the positive correlation between concentration and productivity before the First 
World War, one might reasonably remain sceptical about the statistical significance of a 
post-war negative correlation which necessarily is driven by one observation of low 
concentration: the only possible one, that for the USA. At the very least, there may still 
be other unexplored variables also determining relative performance. One mechanism 
emphasised in the literature can, however, be ruled out: that competition led to greater, 
US-generated technological innovation after 1911. The American Machine and Foundry 
Company (a subsidiary of American Tobacco until 1912) was in the early twentieth 
century the leading supplier to the global market of the cigarette machinery that 
represented a large part of the tobacco industry’s future. However, by the 1930s technical 
leadership had passed to the British firm, Molins, founded by Cuban-American 
immigrants to London, financed (and significantly controlled by) the British-owned, 
arch-monopolists of the period, Imperial Tobacco and BAT (Hall 1975, Monopolies 
Commission 1961). Despite having entered the US domestic market through the 
  13acquisition of Brown & Williamson in 1927, BAT decided to allow sales of the Molins 
machines to its US rivals, successfully competing in the US cigarette market on price and 
brand, not on its technological lead. The competitive and highly productive American 
cigarette industry thus substantially relied on imports of British technology, until in the 
1960s technological leadership passed to the German firm, Hauni. This supports 
Zitzewitz’s emphasis on tighter labour management and rationalisation of sub-scale 
production in America as the likely source of the emerging US productivity lead, but is 




This uncharacteristic slippage in cigarette machinery apart, the observation of American 
manufacturing forging ahead by the mid-twentieth century is not, of course, unique to the 
tobacco industry. It seems entirely plausible that the large continental market of the USA, 
with vigorous internal competition, reinforced by antitrust policies that were compatible 
(given large market size, and despite high levels of protectionism) with economies of 
scale, should have generated strong performance. European countries – all of them 
significantly smaller – for long denied themselves similar advantages through increased 
protectionism and continued legal promotion of or toleration of national champions, 
monopolies and cartels. The obvious hypothesis, identifying the vigour of competition as 
the source of the mid-century transatlantic forging ahead in productivity (only reversed 
by Europe-wide integration, effective anti-monopoly laws and global tariff reductions in 
                                                 
13 The capacity of Imperial Tobacco and its BAT associate to finance innovation should not be under-rated. 
Imperial was, in 1937, the second largest industrial firm by equity capitalisation, after General Motors, on 
the world’s stock markets and BAT was twelfth, ahead of the largest US-based successor company to 
American Tobacco at twenty-third (Schmitz 1995).This is an impressive testimony to the power of 
monopoly over addictive goods, in the absence of antitrust laws, to generate super-normal profit. 
  14the 1950s and 1960s) can be advanced only a little further by this excursion into one, 
exceptionally structured industry, which is not as unambiguously supportive of the case 
as Zitzewitz implied.     
 
 
                                                              References  
Alford, B. W. E. W. D. & H. O. Wills and the development of the UK tobacco industry,                                   
1786-1965. London: Methuen, 1973. 
Anonymous. Tabako Senbaishi (History of the Tobacco Monopoly). Vol. 4. Tokyo: 
Nihon Tabako Sanyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 1980. 
Blaich, Fritz. Der Trustkampf (1901-1915). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1975. 
Board of Trade, Third Report of the Census of Production for 1924. London: HMSO, 
1932. 
Bormann, Kurt. Die deutsche Zigarettenindustrie. Tübingen: Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft, 1910.  
Broadberry, S.N. The Productivity Race: British manufacturing in historical perspective, 
1850-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Burns, Malcolm R., “Outside Intervention in Monopolistic Price Warfare: The Case of 
the “Plug War” and the Union Tobacco Company.” Business History Review 56, no.1 
(1982): 33-53. 
_______________, “Predatory Pricing and the acquisition costs of competitors.” Journal 
of Political Economy 94, (1986): 226-96. 
  15_______________, “New Evidence on Predatory Pricing.” Managerial and Decision 
Economics 10 (1989): 327-30. 
 Commissioner of Corporations. Report on the Tobacco Industry, vol. 1. Washington DC: 
GPO, 1909. 
_________________________. Report on the Tobacco Industry, vol. 2. Washington DC: 
GPO, 1911. 
_________________________. Report on the Tobacco Industry, vol. 3. Washington DC: 
GPO, 1915. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Annual Report. Washington DC: GPO, 1892-1912 
Cox, Howard. The Global Cigarette: Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco                               
1880-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 Cox, Reavis. Competition in the American Tobacco Industry 1911-1932: a study of the 
effects of the partition of the American Tobacco Company by the United States Supreme 
Court. New York: Columbia University Press, 1933. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Census of Manufactures 
1914. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917. 
Hall, Richard. The Making of Molins. Bristol: Molins, 1975.  
Hannah, Leslie and Kay, J. A. Concentration in Modern Industry. London: Macmillan, 
1976. 
Kolko, Gabriel. The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 
1900-1916. New York: Free Press, 1963. 
Kopylov, V. I. “Tobacco Industry,” in Great Soviet Encyclopedia. New York: Macmillan, 
1976 
  16Madsen, A. W. The State as Manufacturer and Trader: An Examination of Government 
Tobacco Monopolies. London: Unwin, 1916.  
Mints, L. E. Trudovye resurcy SSSR. Moscow: Nauka, 1975. 
Monopolies Commission. Report on the Supply of Cigarettes and Tobacco and of 
Cigarette and Tobacco Machinery. London: HMSO, 1961. 
Moody, John. The Long Road Home: an Autobiography. New York: Macmillan, 1933. 
Nutter, Warren G. Growth of Industrial Production in the Soviet Union. Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1962 
Schmitz, Christopher J. The growth of big business in the United States and Western 
Europe, 1850-1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Stigler, George J. “The Economic Effects of Antitrust Laws.” Journal of Law and 
Economics, vol. 9, October 1966, as reprinted in his The Organization of Industry, 
Homewood ILL: Irwin, 1968:  259-295. 
Todd, G. F. Statistics of Smoking.  London: Tobacco Manufacturers’ Standing Committee, 
1959. 
Wilkinson, H. L. The Trust Movement in Australia. Melbourne:  Critchley Parker, 1914. 
Wolf, Jacob. Der Tabak: Anbau, Handel und Verarbeitung. Leipzig: Teubner, 1918. 
Zitzewitz, Eric W. “Competition and Long-Run Productivity Growth in the UK and US 
Tobacco Industries, 1879-1939.” Journal of Industrial Economics Vol. 51, No.1, March 
2003: 1-33. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
                                             STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
  17Table I. The British concentration figures are from Alford (1973) and Monopolies 
Commission (1961). The US figures are the author’s aggregation of data on market share 
and total sales of individual products in Commissioner of Corporations (1909, 1915) up 
to 1913, using the method described in footnote 2 above. Thereafter US firm market 
share data by weight is not available for all products, but in 1919 and 1934 American 
Tobacco’s net dollar sales for all products are given here as a percentage of the census 
tobacco industry value of products figure. The largest firm is assumed to be American 
Tobacco for all dates in the USA (though this may not be correct for 1890, when a plug 
company may have been slightly larger, and in the 1930s when R. J. Reynolds vied with 
it for top position), and is correctly assumed to be Wills (after 1901 Imperial Tobacco) in 
the UK. Gallaher’s sales (perhaps 5% of the market) are not included with Imperial’s 
from 1934, despite the fact that the latter then secretly acquired a controlling majority of 
its shares. The share of Imperial in cigarettes is stated by the Monopolies Commission for 
1920, 1934 and 1948, but for all tobacco manufactures only in 1920 and 1948: my 
estimate for 1934 depends on the assumption that the closing of the 18 point gap of 1920 
between the two measures to 3 points by 1948 had largely occurred by 1934. 
 
 
Table II. Data relate to calendar 1912 or the financial year beginning in March-July 1912, 
except for Spain, where they relate to calendar 1913. Productivity figures are calculated 
(using the figure for all employment in the denominator) for continental Europe and the 
British dominions from data in Madsen (1916, table facing p. 214, and pp. 222, 235, 243, 
255.), with output taken to be consumption less imports plus exports. An allowance of 
10% of insured employment is made for voluntarily insured and uninsured German 
  18workers and also of 10% of wage-earners for non-wage-earner labour in Canada and 
Australia. The UK figure is from the 1912 Census of Production (Board of Trade, 1932, p. 
218.) and Japan from Anonymous 1980, p. 683. The USA’s output is Madsen’s 
adjustment of the official data for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1913 (1916, table facing 
p. 214, domestic sales plus exports, making no deduction for imports, which were 
negligible, except in cigars), with employment from the 1914 census, less 2%. For Russia, 
employment data for the whole tobacco industry is not available and the productivity data 
relates to cigarettes only, with Nutter’s (1962) output data divided by Mints’ (1975) 
employment data, on the standard assumption that one cigarette weighed one gram. This 
probably flatters Russian physical productivity in that papyrosi, which dominated the 
Russian cigarette market, had hollow cardboard mouthpieces where the modern filter tip 
is and thus contained less than the standard amount of tobacco, but in terms of 
manufacturing they required similar inputs and in terms of consumers delivered similar 
value to a standard weight western cigarette. The concentration ratios are the author’s 
estimates for 1912 from the sources quoted in the text, and are least securely based for 
Canada, Germany and Russia. 
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